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Abstract
This paper presents the assessment of stakeholder impacts of European elec-
tricity transmission network investments for a set of future system devel-
opment scenarios. A techno-economic analysis is adopted, which quantifies
the economic impacts on different stakeholders including electricity produc-
ers, consumers, and network investors, under the future de-carbonisation
pathways described in the IRENE-40 scenarios, ranging from 2010 to 2050.
To quantify the impact of transmission infrastructure development, for each
pathway, two distinct scenarios of future European transmission development
are assessed: ”low” (no new transmission between 2010 and 2050) and ”high”
(optimal transmission development between 2010 and 2050 to accommodate
the generation pathway).
The geographical scope of the analysis covers the EU 27+2 nations. A
detailed case study of Spain and France is presented to illustrate so-called
’asymmetric’ impacts towards different stakeholders in different importing
and exporting zones. The resulting arbitrage trades shift the market equilib-
riums, which eventually affect asymmetrically the welfare of stakeholders.
Keywords: European transmission network investment, IRENE-40,
stakeholder impacts, asymmetric impact, generation/demand scenarios
1. Introduction
Liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation have changed the roles of
stakeholders in the electricity market. Competition is fundamental to most
market reforms and it is introduced in order to reduce costs and increase
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efficiency [1]. In the restructured environment, the functions of the trans-
mission system have expanded beyond the roles of linking generation to load
and ensuring system reliability. Interconnection enables more generators to
compete in the market to serve the combined load. Inadequate transmis-
sion capability leading to bottlenecks enables generators at specific locations
in the network to exercise market power in local markets [2]. Investing in
transmission system, therefore, is the key for enhancing competition and
mitigating market power in a restructured market environment.
In terms of transmission network investment, different stakeholders have
different interests, which means that they will have different investment per-
spectives and strategies along the network expansion value chain [3, 4, 5].
In the context of the European continent, stakeholders consists of European
commission/policy makers, regulators, producers, consumers, TSOs, network
owners, network planners, private investors, and manufacturers amongst oth-
ers.
This paper presents an analysis for the evaluation of the economic im-
pact that such investment decisions cause on different market participants
such as producers, consumers and the market operator, under various de-
carbonisation pathways towards a low-carbon economy [6]. Various economic
indices are adopted such as producer surplus, consumer surplus, congestion
surplus and welfare from the optimization [7, 8, 9, 10]. The technical and
economic assessment of different investment alternatives for the electricity
transmission infrastructure reveals so-called ’asymmetric’ impacts towards
different stakeholders in importing and exporting zones in the future Euro-
pean electricity system when large scale of renewable energy will be inte-
grated into the system. The analysis is based on the five generation/demand
scenarios, developed by the IRENE-40 project. A case study of Spain and
France is presented in higher level of detail to illustrate the ’asymmetric’
impacts towards different stakeholders in different importing and exporting
zones.
2. Network Topology and Capacity Expansion Perspectives
A simplified model of the EU transmission grid is used, consisting from
the key transmission corridors between the different countries. 1 Figure 1
1In the IRENE-40 project framework, this model was used for assessing characteristics
of an overlaying supergrid infrastructure. The results from this analysis was further fed
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Figure 1: RES scenario, Year 2050 transmission network capacity reinforce-
ments
shows the schematic layout the EU transmission grid, consisting of EU 27+2
countries [11] and the cross-border capacity reinforcement needs for the RES
scenario in 2050. In the developed network topology, the present intercon-
nectors are maintained and future interconnectors are placed between coun-
tries. Two distinct electricity transmission infrastructure expansion scenarios
are used. The ’low’ scenario assumes that the levels of transmission infras-
tructure capacity registered by the ENTSO-E for the year 2010 (including
planned reinforcements) remain constant in all de-carbonisation pathways
over the 40-year period from 2010 to 2050 [12]. The ’high’ scenario considers
the optimal level of transmission infrastructure capacity quantified for each
decade of the different de-carbonisation pathways over the 40-year period
from 2010 to 2050.
to a detailed network model in order to validate the chosen network structures [11].
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3. Generation/Demand Scenarios
Five scenarios for electricity demand and generation for the EU 27+2
countries until 2050 have been developed within the IRENE-40 project [13],
namely BUSINESS AS USUAL (BAU), RENEWABLE (RES), DESERTEC
(DES), CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE (CCS), and HIGH EFFI-
CIENCY (EFF) [14]. These demand and generation scenarios were con-
structed so that they span a wide range of future possible developments such
as the share and location of renewables, the penetration of carbon capture
and storage technologies and the impact of efficiency measures to the elec-
tricity demand. They are interpreted as a set of electricity demand assump-
tions for each of the EU 27+2 countries for 10-year steps between 2010-2050.
Furthermore, they include the assumed generation mix based on installed
capacity for different generation technologies. The overview of the five gen-
eration/demand scenarios is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Overview of the five generation/demand scenarios
Scenario Short description
BAU 80% CO2 reduction in 2050 not achieved
CCS Substantial contribution from CCS to attain 80% goal
RES High contribution of RES to 80% goal
DES Similar as RES but with import from Africa
EFF Lower electricity demand than other scenarios
Business as usual pathway (BAU) is characterised by a less ambitious
generation mix for emission reduction targets, where the RES uptake after
2020 is slow and fossil fuel generation technologies remain the favoured to
supply energy demand. With respect to the generation mix the main differ-
ence between RES and CCS scenarios is a scenario of 80% share of renewable
electricity in 2050 versus a scenario in which a large contribution to the 2050
objective of 90-95% CO2 reduction comes from Carbon Capture and Stor-
age technology. The DES scenario also assumes 80% renewable electricity
in 2050, but a large share (equivalent to 15% of annual electricity demand)
comes from import from North Africa. In the EFF scenario extra efficiency
measures are implemented, causing a lower final electricity demand than in
the other scenarios. Four of the five scenarios are intended to lead to a CO2
reduction in 2050 of about 80% compared to 1990 level or 90-95% compared
4
!Generation and Transmission Investment Model:
Minimisation of the overall generation and transmission 
investment cost and generation operating cost
Reliability Assessment Model:
Generation capacity adequacy assessment
System Balancing Model:
Minimisation of generation operating cost
Data Base
Adequate level of generation capacity;
Overall cost of investment and operation;
Generation and transmission capacity factors (utilisation);
Expected energy penetration level of renewable.
Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 2: Structure of the Dynamic System Investment Model (DSIM)
to 2010 levels. Only in the Business as Usual scenario (BAU) the CO2 emis-
sion reduction is lower.
4. Methodology Overview
4.1. Model Description
In order to assess the techno-economic aspects of the operation of the
future European electricity system, a set of comprehensive models have been
developed. Figure 2 presents a generic overview of the modelling approach
[15]. The models include: (i) generation and transmission investment model;
(ii) reliability assessment model; and (iii) system balancing model. The mod-
els work in tandem so that the expansion of the transmission network infras-
tructure is optimised to the lowest overall system cost to support the ex-
change and sharing of renewable resources across borders, and to ensure that
low-carbon resources are efficiently utilised when available. Under this frame-
work, trade-offs are made between adding transmission capacity, backup
generation and incurring additional operating costs to balance the power
system. The model provides hourly generation dispatch and locational elec-
tricity market prices for each region. These prices reflect fuel costs, carbon
costs, and also scarcity rent. The prices also are also affected by transmission
investment decisions taken by the model. The changes in social welfare for
each stakeholder can be analysed using these information. In this paper, the
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scope of generation system optimisation is limited to peaking plant. The
main generation mixes are given as postulated in the IRENE-40 scenarios
[14]. Therefore, the commercial feasibility of generation backgrounds used in
this scenario is not the scope of this paper.
The fundamental indicators used to evaluate the economic impact of al-
ternative investment decisions to different market participants include: a)
producers surplus, b) consumers surplus, c) congestion surplus and d) wel-
fare. These indicators were evaluated across the five IRENE-40 scenarios
for two transmission investment decisions: (i) no new investment (based on
ENTSO-E 2010) and (ii) optimal investment obtained from the model. As
an example, in Figure 1, the resulting optimal transmission capacities for the
RES scenarios are presented.
4.2. Theory Revisit
As can be seen in the Figure 3, for interconnected systems, customers in
imported zones have access to competitive offers from producers located in
exporting zones and consequently the market price decreases resulting in a
further gain in consumer surplus as customers consume higher volumes at
lower prices. In exporting zones the market price increases leading to a fur-
ther gain in producer surplus as producers generate additional volumes at a
higher price and the zonal consumer surplus decreases in the same amount
due to the higher market price. In the presence of relevant restrictions in
physical capacity for the trade, the price between the two markets will differ.
The price difference between the two markets multiplied with the volume of
energy offered and traded from the low price zone to the high price zone is
the congestion rent which accrues. This mechanism thus leads to asymmetric
impacts between stakeholders located in the two sides of the congested in-
terconnector due to the increase/decrease of market prices. In the following
we analyse these impacts for the EU-27 interconnected system. To fully as-
sess the impacts of changing flow patterns, hourly simulations of the system
operation for a period of one year were performed, allowing the statistical
analysis of the economic indicators.
Cross-border interconnection causes asymmetrical impacts (i.e. costs and
benefits) to different electricity market segments:
• Consumers located in importing zones have access to competitive offers
from producers located in exporting zones. The local market price
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Figure 3: Arbitrage trades between adjacent markets
decreases resulting in a further gain in consumer surplus as customers
consume higher volumes at lower prices.
• Producers located in importing zones experience lower energy prices
and a potential decrease in energy production for higher marginal cost
plants (i.e. mid-merit and peak plants) which in turn leads to reduced
revenues and surplus.
• Producers located in exporting zones potentially produce higher vol-
umes of energy from lower marginal cost plants (i.e. renewable energy
sources, base load and mid-peak plants) which are sold at higher prices
permitting them to secure further producer surplus.
• Consumers located in exporting zones observe higher energy prices re-
sulting to an increase of the payments incurred for the consumption of
electricity.
Depending on the generation scenario, different importing/exporting zones
could lead to different (asymmetric) stakeholder impacts. In the following
section, these impacts for the future European system are investigated.
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Figure 4: Asymmetric impacts on different stakeholders in 2050 under opti-
mal transmission investment
5. Analysis of Asymmetric Impacts for the EU 27+2 Countries
5.1. Asymmetric Impacts across All Scenarios
In Figure 4, the differences of the economic indicators due to transmis-
sion development between ”high” and ”low” scenario are presented across
all scenarios. As can be seen, cross-border interconnection causes dissimilar
impacts for different de-carbonisation pathway. Further, the results show
asymmetric impacts (i.e. costs and benefits) to different market players such
as producers, consumers and network investors. In particular, in the Euro-
pean continent, different importing and exporting zones are defined for the
different the IRENE-40 scenarios. The two high renewable scenarios, RES
and DES, show particular interest as the rest three scenarios present sim-
ilar behaviour with less volatility of the economic indices towards different
stakeholders.
In the DES scenario where large shares of renewable electricity is imported
from North Africa, for producers located in Europe, this import represents a
significant reduction in customers’ requests for electricity from European gen-
erators while in turn the energy prices in Europe decrease. As a result of lower
energy prices and lower quantities of energy, producers achieve lower levels
of surplus. Customers will also observe the lower energy prices and therefore
incur in lower payments for electricity, creating significant amount of con-
sumer surplus. In DES, for the case with no new transmission, due to lack of
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RES within Europe, majority of load needs to be supplied from conventional
fossil fuel based power plants, which have high marginal costs. Therefore the
prices are relatively high; in the case where optimal network capacity has
been developed, Europe will import significant amount of electricity from
CSP and PV installed in the North Africa region. As the marginal operat-
ing costs of these power technologies are low; this will drive down electricity
prices in Europe and increase consumer surplus.
In the RES scenario with optimal transmission development, renewable
energy resources, geographically dispersed across Europe, can now be traded
across borders allowing customers to have access to more competitive offers
(i.e. access to low marginal cost energy resources). Thus, producers scattered
across Europe will be required to export higher volumes of energy which
will be sold at higher prices permitting them to secure further producer
surplus. As a consequence of the energy trade, local customers in exporting
zones will be subjected to the higher energy prices while customers located
in neighbouring countries will observe lower energy prices. Thus customers
located in different countries will be subject to higher payments and others to
lower payments for electricity consumption. Consumers surplus is relatively
low in RES since they initially experience some period of low electricity prices
in the system with highly constrained transmission. As the renewable power
generation is scattered across Europe, low consumer surplus effect is visible
to most of countries especially the ones with high RES infeed. The congestion
rent may decrease with the increase in transmission capacity. Comparing the
congestion rent between high and low transmission development scenarios,
the difference in congestion rent appears to decrease to negative values. As
also shown in Figure 6, transmission expansion tends to reduce the congestion
rent in RES as the market prices in both ends converge. However, as the
volume of power exchange increases the impact of transmission expansion on
congestion rent is non-linear. Development of transmission actually reduces
the period of low electricity prices; on the other hand it also reduces the
period of very high electricity prices and the price volatility. In the next
section, the RES pathway is presented in greater detail to demonstrate the
asymmetric impacts upon various stakeholders in Europe.
5.2. Asymmetric Impacts between Zones: SPAIN-FRANCE in RES Pathway
5.2.1. Producer surplus
Figure 5 shows the producer surplus per country for the two electricity
transmission infrastructure expansion scenarios. It shows that the expansion
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Figure 5: Producer surplus in 2050
Table 2: Energy import/export and electricity price in Spain
Year 2050
Scenario
Electricity production Imports Exports Average electricity price
[TWh] [TWh] [TWh] [€/MWh]
Low 555 12 3 157
High 524 82 51 110
of cross-border interconnection has adverse impact on the levels of surplus
attained by producers due to the formation of new price zones.
In particular, it can be observed that additional interconnection capac-
ity causes specific asymmetrical impacts to specific importing and exporting
zones: it significantly decreases the producers surplus in Spain and signifi-
cantly increases the surplus of the producers located in France. These coun-
tries are then chosen to be analysed in greater detail.
Spain Table 2 presents the energy imports, exports and the average
electricity price registered in Spain for the electricity transmission infrastruc-
ture expansion scenarios. Reinforcing the interconnection to France allows
customers in Spain to access to competitive offers from producers in Europe,
leading to lower electricity prices and to lower producer surplus.
With more than 220 GW of renewables (wind power,PV, and CSP) con-
nected in Spain, including renewables in MENA that connect to Spain, the
impact of those zero marginal cost generators on the electricity prices is sig-
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(a) Electricity price duration curve
in Spain
(b) Electricity price difference be-
tween Spain - France
Figure 6: Electricity price profile in 2050 in RES pathway
nificant. This is demonstrated in Figure 6a, where circa 20% of the time,
the prices are very low. This especially happens when the output of the
renewables need to be curtailed as the system is constrained. In 80% of the
time, the prices are non-zero as the market prices are determined by non-
zero marginal cost generators. In these periods, non-marginal generators
earn income to compensate their capital expenditure.
It can be seen in Figure 6b that additional interconnection capacity re-
duces the price difference between the adjacent markets. For instance, for the
high scenario, the occurrence of lower price differences increases significantly
whereas higher price differences substantially decreases. Price differences
from 110 [€/MWh] to 170 [€/MWh] register no occurrences in the high
scenario compared with the low scenario. Adding further interconnection
capacity so that all arbitrage trades are covered results into an equal price
in Spain and France.
Figure 7 shows the producers surplus per renewable energy source in Spain
for the electricity transmission infrastructure expansion scenarios. It can be
observed that additional interconnection capacity induces a loss in surplus for
wind producers and creates a gain in surplus for Solar PV producers in Spain.
It can also be seen that renewable energy sources with storage capability such
as Solar CSP (i.e. limited capability), reservoir hydro and storage register a
reduction in surplus due to the expansion of the transmission network. This
is mainly due to the fact that cross-border interconnection provides flexibility
to the electric power system reducing the operating requirements of storage
11
Figure 7: Producer surplus per energy source in Spain
facilities to flatten the electricity demand profile.
Figure 8 presents the daily correlation between the energy produced by all
energy sources and the flow utilisation for the cross-border interconnection
between Spain and France interconnector. Setting Spain as the reference
country, a positive flow utilisation implies that Spain imports from France,
whereas a negative flow utilisation represents exports from Spain to France.
Figure 8 shows coincidence between wind power production and the pe-
riods of high electricity prices observed in the low scenario. This indicates
that wind producers sell energy during long periods at higher prices which in
turn results in higher surplus. For the scenario with additional interconnec-
tion capacity, it can be seen that Spain imports energy from France during
long off-peak periods. Moreover, it can be observed in Figure 8 a significant
degree of correlation between the availability of Solar PV power output and
the periods of high demand. Under the scenario with limited interconnection
capacity, Spain registers significantly lower electricity prices due to the high
availability of these zero marginal cost plants. Thus, Solar PV producers sell
significant quantities of energy at lower prices resulting in a relatively lower
surplus. The presence of additional interconnection capacity facilitates the
integration of renewable energy sources. In this context, part of this energy
will access to load in France increasing the prices in Spain. It can be seen in
Figure 7 that Solar PV producers benefit from additional interconnection ca-
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Figure 8: Imports/Exports and availability of renewable energy sources in
Spain
pacity to France since they sell significant volumes of energy at higher prices
resulting in an increase of their surplus.
France Table 3 presents the energy imports, exports and the average
electricity price observed in France for the electricity transmission infrastruc-
ture expansion scenarios. Specifically, it shows that France is predominantly
an exporting country. For instance, in the low scenario the energy exports
are four times larger than the energy imports. Increasing the capacity of
cross-border interconnection allows the producers in France to reach con-
sumers located in high price zones such as Spain. In this respect, producers
will be demanded higher energy quantities resulting in an increase of the
electricity prices in France. It can be seen in Table 3 that the price rises
from 77 [€/MWh] for low transmission expansion to 105 [€/MWh] for the
high transmission expansion scenario. Consequently, the producer surplus
in France increases due to the investment carried out in the Spain - France
interconnector.
5.2.2. Consumer surplus
For the pathway year 2050, cross-border interconnection enables a stronger
deployment of renewable energy sources into the electric power system. Re-
newable energy sources are traded across borders which generally results in
higher electricity prices for local consumers and lower electricity prices for
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Table 3: Energy import/export and electricity price in France
Year 2050
Scenario
Electricity production Imports Exports Average electricity price
[TWh] [TWh] [TWh] [€/MWh]
Low 895 18 74 77
High 889 138 189 105
Figure 9: Consumer surplus in 2050
consumers in the neighbouring countries. Thus customers located in different
countries will be subject to higher payments and others to lower payments
for electricity consumption.
Figure 9 shows that the consumers in Spain benefit from a 37 [b€] re-
duction on their payment for electricity when well interconnected to France.
In contrast, additional interconnection capacity between Spain and France
means that consumers in France see a rise of 26 [b€] in their electricity
payments. Consumers in France are faced with higher volumes of energy
being produced and exported to serve consumers in Spain. This results in
an increase of the prices in France which has to be sustained by the local
consumers.
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Figure 10: Congestion surplus in 2050
5.2.3. Congestion surplus
Interconnector: Spain - France It is noted that the revenue for the
interconnection between Spain and France presents an opposite behaviour to
that aforementioned. For instance, Figure 10 shows that in the year 2050, the
revenue obtained by the interconnection increases from 1,242 [M€] for low
scenario to 2,556 [M€] for high scenario. Additional interconnection capacity
reduces physical congestion and consequently the price difference between
adjacent markets. Nonetheless, it should be observed that the capacity of the
interconnection significantly increases from 1,400 [MW] for the low scenario
to 21,500 [MW] for the high scenario resulting in higher magnitude of flows.
5.2.4. Welfare
It has been demonstrated that cross-border interconnection facilitates the
integration of renewable energy sources into the electricity system. In this
context, we observe a reduction in the level of curtailment of renewable en-
ergy when additional interconnection capacity is present in the system. The
electricity system accommodates higher levels of renewable energy sources
that can be traded across borders allowing customers to have access to more
economic offers from producers located in neighbouring countries (i.e. access
to low marginal cost energy resources).
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6. Conclusion
This paper provides a technical and economic analysis to evaluate the
impact that different investment decisions for electricity transmission infras-
tructure cause on various market participants such as producers, consumers
and market operators, based on the IRENE-40 generation/demand scenarios.
Adopting economic indicators such as producers surplus, consumers surplus,
congestion surplus and welfare, ’asymmetric’ impacts towards different stake-
holders in different importing and exporting zones are presented, detailed by
the analysis of Spain and France.
Broadly, the presence of additional interconnection capacity decreases the
physical congestion between the interconnected countries. The consequence
is that the price difference between neighbouring countries diminishes and so
does congestion surplus. Investment in cross-border interconnection capacity
increases the welfare of the electricity system. The welfare gain arises be-
cause there is greater competition in the importing market provided by the
existence of cheaper resources in the exporting market, resulting in a more
efficient use of resources overall.
As demonstrated in this paper, the impacts of transmission development
are system specifics. For example, in the RES scenario producers gain more
than consumers while in the DES scenario, the contrary happens. This is
related to different distribution of generation especially renewables in these
two scenarios. In the DES scenario, renewables are more concentrated in
Southern Europe while in the RES scenario, they are more distributed across
Europe.
The asymmetric impact on the welfare of stakeholders causes arbitrage
trades shifting away from the market equilibriums, which may further cause
potentially delay the development of cross-border interconnectors as it opens
the question as to who should pay for the cost of investment in intercon-
nectors. In addition, different policy developments, as they are mapped in
different scenarios, lead to adverse impacts to stakeholders, which further
complicates the allocation of costs. The dissimilar impact on interconnectors
caused by different electricity market participants signals that costs may
need to be allocated in accordance with the importance that each market
participant places on the interconnection.
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